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THE CONTROL ROOM

Where strategic experience meets the future of innovation.

The Cloudflare Outage November 2025: Why Your Resilient Architecture is Just Operational Theater

  • Writer: Tony Grayson
    Tony Grayson
  • Nov 18
  • 4 min read

Updated: 24 hours ago

By Tony Grayson Tech Executive (ex-SVP Oracle, AWS, Meta) & Former Nuclear Submarine Commander


Screenshot of the Cloudflare System Status page displaying a red 'Global Network experiencing issues' alert during the Cloudflare Outage November 2025.
The face of a single point of failure: The official status page confirms the Cloudflare Outage November 2025, where a configuration error triggered a 'Global Network experiencing issues' alert that cascaded across the internet.

The Cloudflare Outage November 2025 was the moment half the internet went dark. On that Tuesday, the most telling detail wasn’t that X, ChatGPT, Shopify, and hundreds of other sites crashed. It was that Downdetector itself was unreachable.


Think about that for a moment. The service used to check whether other services are down was down due to the exact same root cause. That’s not irony; that’s a systemic architectural failure that should terrify every CTO and infrastructure lead reading this.


Why the Cloudflare Outage in November 2025 Proves You Can't Engineer Around Dependencies


I spent years in nuclear submarine operations, where single points of failure mean people die. Then I spent more years at AWS, Meta, and Oracle managing hyperscale infrastructure, where we obsessed over redundancy at every layer. Most of what passes for "resilient architecture" in enterprise IT is, at best, theater.


The Cloudflare Outage November 2025 incident was triggered by an automatically generated configuration file used to manage threat traffic. It grew beyond its expected size, crashing the software that routes traffic across Cloudflare's network, [suspicious link removed], citing the company's post-incident explanation. Within hours, it took down access to major platforms serving hundreds of millions of users globally.


Here’s what makes this particularly damaging: companies affected by this outage almost certainly have sophisticated multi-region deployments. They’ve invested millions in redundant data centers, active-active architectures, and disaster recovery plans. Their infrastructure teams have run countless chaos engineering exercises.


And none of it mattered.


The Dirty Secret of Cloud Architecture


The dirty secret is that we’ve traded data center risk for application layer risk and we pretend we haven’t. Every architect knows this intellectually, but few organizations price it into their actual decision-making.


Consider the standard enterprise deployment:

  • Physical layer: Redundant power feeds, N+1 cooling, and multiple fiber paths ✓

  • Network layer: Redundant switches, multiple ISPs, and BGP failover ✓

  • Compute layer: Auto-scaling groups and multi-AZ deployments ✓

  • Application layer: CDN, WAF, DDoS protection... provided by one vendor ✗


That last line is where the entire stack falls over. And it’s not unique to the Cloudflare Outage November 2025—pick your critical dependency. Auth0 for authentication. Stripe for payments. Twilio for communications. AWS itself.


The mathematical reality is brutal: if your infrastructure has 99.999% uptime ("five nines") but you’re dependent on a service with 99.9% uptime ("three nines"), your actual availability is 99.9%. The weakest link wins. Always.


The Economic Lesson of the Cloudflare Outage November 2025


In military infrastructure, particularly in submarine and nuclear systems, we don’t design for redundancy alone. We design for the independence of critical paths. That’s not just semantics. It’s a fundamentally different architectural philosophy.


When I commanded USS PROVIDENCE, our safety systems didn’t just have backups. They had backups using entirely different physical principles. We didn’t trust any single vendor, any single technology, or any single failure mode assumption.


Today’s commercial infrastructure has somehow forgotten this lesson. The economics of cloud computing and SaaS have pushed us toward concentration rather than distribution. Toward efficiency, not resilience. Toward shared services, not independent systems.


And when those shared services fail—as they inevitably do—the blast radius is staggering.


H2: Auditing Your Single Points of Failure


If you’re running critical infrastructure—and if you’re reading this, you probably are—here’s what you need to price into your following architecture review:

  1. Map your SaaS Dependencies: Not the ones in your data center diagrams. The real ones: the CDN providers, DNS hosts, and authentication layers. Write them down and ask: what happens when each one fails?

  2. Calculate Actual Availability: If you’re using six services with 99.9% uptime each, your system availability is approximately 99.4%. That’s about 52 hours of downtime per year.

  3. Build Failover Paths: Implement competing services in parallel (expensive but effective) or accept the risk and price it into your SLAs. What you can't do is assume the problem away.


I can already hear the objections: "Running our own CDN/WAF/DDoS protection is prohibitively expensive!"


Maybe. But is it more expensive than your entire customer-facing infrastructure being down for three hours during peak business hours? Because that’s what happened during the Cloudflare Outage November 2025. To companies that have spent millions on "enterprise-grade" infrastructure.


At Northstar, when we’re designing AI data centers for defense and intelligence applications, this isn’t even a debate. NATO doesn’t accept "but Cloudflare is really reliable!" as an answer. Neither should you.


The Path Forward


The answer isn’t abandoning Cloudflare or any other service. These companies provide real value and generally excellent reliability. The answer is understanding that reliability is a system property, not a component property.


You need architectural diversity at every layer where failure is unacceptable. Yes, this is expensive. Yes, this is complex. Yes, this is what actual resilience costs.


Or you can keep building redundancy at the data center layer while accepting single points of failure at the application layer. That’s fine too. Just don’t call it "resilient architecture." Call it what it is: operational theater that makes stakeholders feel better right up until it doesn’t.


The Cloudflare Outage November 2025 wasn’t a Cloudflare problem. It was an architecture problem that Cloudflare just happened to expose. The next time, it’ll be a different vendor. The blast radius will be just as large. And we’ll have the same conversations about redundancy and reliability that we’re having right now.


Unless we actually fix the architecture, this will happen again.


Tony


____________________________________


Tony Grayson is a recognized Top 10 Data Center Influencer, a successful entrepreneur, and the President & General Manager of Northstar Enterprise + Defense.


A former U.S. Navy Submarine Commander and recipient of the prestigious VADM Stockdale Award, Tony is a leading authority on the convergence of nuclear energy, AI infrastructure, and national defense. His career is defined by building at scale: he led global infrastructure strategy as a Senior Vice President for AWSMeta, and Oracle before founding and selling a top-10 modular data center company.


Today, he leads strategy and execution for critical defense programs and AI infrastructure, building AI factories and cloud regions that survive contact with reality.


Read more at: tonygraysonvet.com

 
 
 

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